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 Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness 
 
Abstract 
A complex mosaic of forces will affect maritime security through 2020. These 
include economic forces such as (i) illegal international migration–fueled by 
tremendous population increases in developing countries, (ii) drug smuggling, and 
(iii) weapons proliferation, as well as (iv) military threats posed by hostile states, 
failed states, and transnational organizations engaged in intelligence gathering or 
terrorist activities. The President’s National Security Strategy indicates that 
diverse threats such as these must be countered through an integrated approach:  
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA will engage and shape this dynamic 
and expansive environment by detecting anomalies and deviations from 
established trends and patterns in commercial and military traffic, and enabling 
commanders to take appropriate action before security is compromised or crises 
erupt. In line with the theme for this year’s symposium, C2 for complex 
endeavors, MDA encompasses a diverse set of organizations, complex processes, 
and a variety of analytic and collaborative tools. This research reported here will 
advance organizational structures, procedures and C2 technologies to enhance 
global MDA.  Our approach is to document current MDA capabilities, compare 
them with the next phase of expected capabilities based on integrating new 




A confluence of forces will affect maritime security through 2020. These include economic 
forces such as (i) illegal international migration–fueled by tremendous population increases in 
developing countries, (ii) drug smuggling, and (iii) weapons proliferation (Stubbs & Truver, 
1999), as well as (iv) military threats posed by hostile states, failed states, and transnational 
organizations engaged in intelligence gathering or terrorist activities (White House, 1998). The 
President’s National Security Strategy indicates that diverse threats such as these must be 
countered through an integrated approach: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA will 
engage and shape this dynamic and expansive environment by detecting anomalies and 
deviations from established trends and patterns in commercial and military traffic, and enabling 
commanders to take appropriate action before security is compromised or crises erupt (DoN, 
2007). In line with the theme for this year’s symposium, C2 for complex endeavors, MDA 
encompasses a diverse set of organizations, complex processes, and a variety of analytic and 
collaborative tools. This research reported here will advance organizational structures, proce-
dures and C2 technologies to enhance global MDA. Our approach is to document current MDA 
capabilities, compare them with the next phase of expected capabilities based on integrating new 
technologies, and document the gains.    
 
The MDA Prototype Acceleration Project is focused on initial capability fielding of prototype 
tools developed to assist with various aspects of MDA. After the initial assessment, conducted in 
2008, selected tools will subsequently transition to current and/or new Programs of Record in 
FY10 and beyond. Two fielding spirals, Spiral 1 and Spiral 2, were designated for the 
acceleration effort, with Spiral 1 commencing with the publication of the SECNAV 
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 memorandum on 17 May 2007. The Spiral 1 effort focuses on establishing a set of core net-
centric capabilities that, at multiple levels of security, will feed and fuse many data streams into a 
coherent common operational picture for Spiral 1 assessment while providing improved 
analytical and collaboration tools.  
 
The purpose of this research is to develop a comprehensive assessment plan and conduct an 
assessment of the MDA Spiral 1 technologies and associated capabilities to ascertain the value 
added by the various tools. Our approach is to conduct the assessment at the system of systems 
(SoS) level, in keeping with performance and effectiveness areas identified in the MDA 
Prototype Capability Acquisition Strategy (v1.1) of 17 August 2007. This entails working with 
the MDA Spiral 1 planners, functional area managers, site managers, labs, and test organizations 
involved with developing, validating, and assessing definitions, requirements, and designs and 
reporting test and evaluation activities for MDA FY08 Spiral 1.  
 
Background 
MDA was initiated by a Presidential Initiative (White House, 1998) which stimulated a 
requirement for a Quick Reaction Assessment (QRA) to be conducted for MDA Spiral 1 
Acceleration leave behind capabilities. A Secretary of the Navy Project was promulgated and is 
managed by Program Executive Office (PEO), command, control, computers, communications, 
and intelligence (C4I) to increase the United States maritime security. MDA will develop an 
enhanced capability to identify threats in the Maritime Domain as early and as distant from our 
shores as possible by integrating intelligence, surveillance, observation, and navigation systems 
into a common operating picture (COP) accessible throughout the U.S. Government. The MDA 
Science and Technology (S&T) Prototype effort is in the formative stages such that the prototype 
capabilities have broadly stated capability thresholds and objectives.  
 
Various assessment events will be conducted to evaluate the existing system of systems ability to 
meet MDA requirements (with selected technology insertions, as they are available at different 
venues of opportunity). These FY08 scheduled events will provide opportunities to establish how 
well the MDA tools meet the MDA stated capabilities, measures of effectiveness, and measures 
of performance. Various venues of opportunity offer events that permit collecting, collating, 
analyzing, and documenting performance and effectiveness data related to the MDA tasks to 
establish a baseline of effectiveness and performance parameters. This baseline data will provide 
opportunities to establish more specific and measurable effectiveness and performance 
parameters for future MDA efforts in the stated focus areas of monitoring, collecting, fusing, 
analyzing, and disseminating MDA data to the decision makers.  
 
MDA Objectives  
The campaign plan lists the following National and Navy MDA objectives and critical tasks. At 
the national level, MDA objectives include the ability to persistently monitor in the global 
maritime domain, vessels and craft, cargo, vessel crews, and passengers. This monitoring capa-
bility applies to all identified area maritime situation awareness areas of interest, and includes 
gaining access to and maintaining data on vessels, facilities, and infrastructure. A critical 
capability entails the ability to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate information to decision 
makers to facilitate effective understanding among all nodes in the organization, and to access, 
develop and maintain data on MDA-related mission performance.  
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Navy MDA Objectives include the ability to:  
• Create a global network of unclassified regionally-based maritime information exchange 
partnerships (with framework) which net-centrically integrates regional maritime 
situation awareness into global maritime situation awareness. 
• Establish an institution of worldwide standards and cooperation/coordination for 
broadcast of vessel position and identification. 
• Improve maritime change detection, the capability to discern patterns, changes, and 
potential threats. 
• Improve threat awareness (TA) and alert maritime partners of suspicious behavior and 
potential threats. 
• Secure the United States from direct attack by confronting early and at safe distances, 
those who threaten us.   
• Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action by ensuring that key regions, 
lines of communication and the global commons remain accessible to all. 
• Strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships to address common 
challenges.   
• Establish favorable security conditions by countering aggression or coercion (including 




Our approach was to document the current MDA process, as it is currently conducted, so that we 
can measure the operational impact of new Spiral 1 MDA technologies. Our objective is to 
define and assess future MDA processes and technologies and then develop a refined version of 
the process. We began by viewing the overall MDA process in the context of a tracking scenario 
and a boarding scenario to document the current, present state of MDA processes and 
capabilities. The ‘to be’ (expected) version of MDA workflow for the future will be used to 
develop techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) and to make recommendations for other 
related changes, e.g., training, staffing, etc. These documents were validated in a process 
engineering workshop held in January 2008 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
and a February 2008 workshop to align the model with the current process model for Maritime 
Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers (MHQ w/ MOC). The workflow was also 
translated into a DoD Architectural Framework (DoDAF) process database (OV-6c). The 
workflow product will inform experiments and fielding of an initial operating capability.  
Specifically, a set of potential stress points within the MDA workflow have been identified. 
These will be a focus of upcoming experiments, and process recommendations concerning these 
stress points have been drafted. 
 
Developing Workflow Process Models 
Initial visits were made by NPS project team members to Commander, Third Fleet (C3F), 
Commander, Seventh Fleet (C7F), U.S. Naval Force, Central Command (NAVCENT), and 
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Interviews were conducted with MDA subject matter experts 
(SMEs) and MDA workflow process models were developed. SMEs were asked to describe in as 
much detail as possible how MDA is accomplished and a semi-structured set of interview 
questions was used to obtain detailed information about: (1) MDA tasks, (2) the entities that 
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 execute them, (3) the precedence relationships (or flow) between those tasks, and, when possible, 
(4) the media used to communicate between tasks, (5) the products of those tasks, and (6) the 
potential application points for Spiral 1 technologies. Table 1 lists the questions posed to SMEs 
regarding the current ‘as is’ MDA process workflow. 
 
Table 1.  Questions Posed to Subject Matter Experts Regarding the Current  
‘As Is’ MDA Process Workflow. 
 
 
  1.  What information do you request from external sources? 
 
  2.  What information do you produce internally at this point? 
 
  3.  What information do you pass to external entities at this point? 
 
  4.  Which information sources (people, technologies) have the greatest value or priority? 
  
  5.  How do these steps fail, when they fail (e.g., timeliness, completeness, accuracy, confliction )? 
 
  6.  What is the frequency of each task? 
 
  7.  What is the duration of each task? 
 
  8.  How many full-time staff are required by each task?  
 
  9.  Which Spiral 1 technologies would improve your operations most? How? 
 
Our general framework for developing an understanding of the overall MDA process is 
illustrated in Figure 1. This comprehensive approach considers the constraints that will affect 
personnel while performing the tasks in addition to the data/ information inputs and outputs for 















Required Resources  
 
Figure 1. General Framework Used for MDA Task Workflow Definition. 
 
The NPS research team elicited additional information about workflow and technology-related 
issues in interviews with Commander, Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT), Maritime Intelligence 
Fusion Center, Pacific (MIFCPAC), ONI, and NAVCENT. Two types of analyses were 
conducted using interview data. A qualitative analysis was performed to identify areas of 
concern and generate recommendations. A process analysis was performed to define the current 
– or ‘as is’ – workflow. The objective was to define the current – or ‘as is’ – flow of MDA tasks 
in a representative sample of organizations, and to capture issues of concern to those 
organizations regarding MDA Spiral 1 technologies. Representatives of more than 20 
organizations reviewed and revised the workflow products in two workshops. 
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Figures 2-4 present the current version of the ‘as is’ MDA workflow process model. Using the 
observe, orient, decide, act (OODA)-loop model as a framework for presenting the MDA 
process, Figure 2 shows the MDA process begins with generation of ‘tipper’ information, which 
can occur at several locations, or commands. The ‘decide’ phase of the overall process begins 
when the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) Director, directs either current operations (COPs) 
or future operations (FOPs) to process the vessel of interest (VOI). This process includes several 
requests for information (RFI), as well as several other steps: defining the course of action 
(COA), and handoff of the mission to another MOC. Finally, the ‘act’ portion of the process, 
involves conducting a visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) on the VOI. Each step depicted in 
the boxes included in Figures 2-4 has a code next to the box for the step to indicate the method of 
communicating the information: briefs, chat, email, face-to-face, message traffic, phone, or other 
(to be determined).  
 
Figure 3, depicts the boarding process as it is currently done (‘as-is’). The commands that have a 
role are listed along the left axis and the steps involved are depicted in the corresponding rows 
for each command, with arrows indicating where the outcome of a process connects to the next 
step, and the method used to communicate information. Spiral 1 capabilities and technologies 
that are expected to be added to enhance the various steps in the MDA process are also listed in 
each box in the model. These were determined during interviews with SMEs at the commands 
included in the MDA process. Figure 4 continues the depiction of the MDA workflow process 
model by showing the steps entailed in a handoff of a VOI from one MOC to another MOC. 
 
The workflow model that was developed focuses mainly on NAVCENT and represents the 
relatively efficient processes used by NAVCENT. (The decision to focus on NAVCENT was 
made following site visits to C3F, C7F, NAVCENT, and ONI). The workflow model illustrates 
the processes required to execute two scenarios: (1) tracking a vessel of interest (VOI) and (2) 
handing off the VOI from one numbered fleet commander to another. These scenarios implement 
the first two scenarios envisioned in the draft MDA Spiral 1 Scoping Document1, and they 
arguably incorporate several of the remaining Spiral 1 scenarios. We will expand the workflow 
models to address additional scenarios as needed.  
 
 
1 The draft Scoping Document for Navy Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Spiral 1 Prototype, version 
2, 11 OCT 2007 specifies the following scenarios: (1) Track vessels via fusion of multiple data sources 
across the maritime knowledge base, incorporating both current and archived data; (2) Vessel Tracking 
handoff across Fleet Areas of Responsibility (AORs); (3) Collaborate between nodes; (4) Establish a near-
real time maritime Common Operational Picture that provides access to tactical, operational, and strategic 
data elements; (5) Improve timely transfer of vessel data collected at the tactical level to appropriate 
operational and strategic nodes (e.g., Expanded Maritime Interception Operations (EMIO), AARs, and 
track updates); (6) Enable participating Navy commanders to network globally through real-time 
collaboration and information sharing, supporting decision making at the strategic, operational, and tactical 












Figure 4.  MDA ‘As Is’ Track and Surveillance w/ Handoff from MOC to MOC.
 
 A second round of interviews was conducted to refine these workflow models with site visits to 
ONI, NAVCENT, and MIFC. Specifically, the interview protocol for these site visits was 
designed to: (1) identify additional tasks and task-task relationships, define them operationally, 
and identify potential failure points; (2) identify information input requirements, (3) identify 
information outputs, (4) specify requirements regarding human resources, technology, and time; 
and (5) specify constraints regarding human resources, technology, and time. These attributes on 
MDA tasks are represented in scenarios as needed.  
 
Process Engineering Workshop 
A process engineering workshop (PEW) was held at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 
Monterey, CA, 15-17 January 2008 to accomplish several critical steps. The objectives of the 
PEW were to: 
• Refine, extend, and validate a process model of Maritime Domain Awareness 
• Define attributes of the activities that constitute MDA, specifically information 
requirements, processing activities, products, and resource (time, manning) requirements 
(reported in Freeman, Heacox, and MacKinnon, 2008) 
• Specify which MDA activities may benefit from Spiral 1 technologies 
• Develop concepts for assessing the effects of technology 
• Identify barriers to fielding MDA Spiral 1 technologies 
 
Representatives of the following organizations participated in the PEW: Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RDA), Commander, THIRD Fleet 
(C3F), Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COTF), Office of the of the Under 
Secretary of the Navy, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), HFE LLC, Joint 
Interoperability Test Command (JITC), METRON, Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center, 
Atlantic (MIFCLANT), Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center, Pacific (MIFCPAC), U.S. Naval 
Force, Central Command (NAVCENT), Naval Network Warfare Command (NNWC), Naval 
Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS), United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), NPS, 
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), Naval Warfare Development Center (NWDC), Office of 
Naval Intelligence (ONI), staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), PMW 120, and 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR). Also participating were subject matter 
experts (SMEs) from several of the MDA Spiral 1 technologies, domain experts (‘gray beards’), 
representatives from the Trident Warrior 2008 (TW08) operational experiment where many of 
the MDA Spiral 1 technologies will be assessed, and members of the assessment team (NPS, 
Aptima, Pacific Science & Engineering, WBB Inc.).  
 
Workflow review. The PEW participants reviewed several MDA OV-6c workflow diagrams 
developed by NAVNETWARCOM from NPS workflow data. These diagrams were: 
‘NAVCENT MDA Process’ (as well as a summary diagram for this workflow (version 11)), 
‘Provide MDA Info-NMIC’, and ‘RFI Processing-NMIC’. Participants recommended revisions 
to the activities, activity-activity precedence (links), and clustering of activities. The number of 
revisions was modest, and participants indicated that these workflows are generally correct. PEW 
participants recommended revisions to the NAVCENT MDA Process workflow to generalize it 
so that it potentially serves MOCs and organizations other than NAVCENT.  
 
Goals for the PEW were to: (1) validate the initial workflow models of the process with subject 
matter experts (SMEs) from the representative commands, (2) discuss how the new tools 
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 developed for MDA will change the process, and (3) develop new process workflow models to 
depict the envisioned processes once the tools are incorporated into the MDA process. Questions 
that were posed to the subject matter expert (SME) attendees are listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Objective Translation of User-Defined Measures. 
 
 
1. What is the range of the number of vessels the watch team must track at any given moment?
 
2.  How often must track data be updated? 
 
3.  If required, how often is manual track updating needed? 
 
4.  What sorts of vessel data (cargo, destination, crew, hull type, flag) are required as part 
     of track data?  
5.  How many AIS tracks are typically received? 
 
6.  How many AIS tracks are typically displayed? 
 
7.  Does the source of track data need to be easily discernable? 
 
 8.  Do sources of track data need to be filtered? 
 
9.  How many tracks from radar can be displayed? 
 
10.  How many tracks from radar need to be displayed? 
 
11.  How many tracks from ELINT can be displayed? 
 






12.  How many tracks from ELINT need to be displayed? 
 
13.  What is the current capability to archive vessel data? 
 
14.  How much more storage, if any, is required to archive vessel data? 
 
15.  What is the maximum number of collating (fusing) events a watch team can coordinate?
 
16. What is the maximum number of collating (fusing) events that ONA could coordinate? 
 
17.  How many tracks would have been identified earlier if harbor or port information  





18.  How many “heads-up” vessel track (cargo, destination, crew, hull type, and flag) events 
       from a  nearby MOC, have taken place over a given month? 
 




20.  How many ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence) requests for information are typically  
made in a given day?  
 
21.  How many conflicts have occurred in a given week, over releasability of the present MDA
  technology (GCCS-M, Centrix, SIPR, chat, JWICS, etc.) 
 
22.  How many conflicts have occurred in a given week, over usability of the present MDA 
technology (GCCS-M, Centrix, SIPR, chat, JWICS, etc.) 
\ 
23.   How many conflicts have occurred in a given week, over reliability of the present MDA 
        technology (GCCS-M, Centrix, SIPR, chat, JWICS, etc.)? 
 
24.  How many conflicts have occurred in a given week, over automation of the present MDA






25.  How many conflicts have occurred in a given week, over supportability of the present  
MDA technology (GCCS-M, Centrix, SIPR, chat, JWICS, etc.) 
 
 
26.  How many conflicts have occurred in a given week, over maintainability of the present  
MDA technology (GCCS-M, Centrix, SIPR, chat, JWICS, etc.) 
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 Scenario for Spiral 1 Assessment of Technologies  
The MDA Spiral 1 effort focuses on a single scenario with the following six identifiable goals:  
(a) track vessels via fusion of multiple data sources across the maritime knowledge base, 
incorporating both current and archived data; (b) vessel tracking handoff across Fleet areas of 
responsibility (AORs); (c) collaborate between nodes; (d) establish a near real-time common 
operation picture (COP); (e) improve transfer of vessel data collected at the tactical level 
(extended maritime interdiction operations (EMIO)); and (f) enable Navy commanders to 
network globally through real-time collaboration and information sharing, supporting decision 
making at the operational and tactical levels across the range of military operations (ROMO). 
(PEO C4I)  The scenario involves information sharing across multiple areas of responsibility 
(AORs) of a suspect vessel in transit from the Middle East to the vicinity of Hawaii. Ultimately, 
the information sharing and collaboration would result in an order to board a tactical unit, such 
that each of the goals stated above would be tested. 
 
Using the process described above, the NPS team documented the workflow of Maritime 
Domain Awareness for a select set of organizations: Afloat Units; Biometrics Fusion Center 
(BFC); Boarding Party; MIFC; COMPACFLT; Combatant Commanders (COCOM); Maritime 
Liaison Officer (MARLO); MIFCLANT; MIFCPAC; NAVCENT MOC; NCIS; Naval Maritime 
Intelligence Center (NMIC); and Subordinate Commanders and Staff. These organizations were 
chosen in part because the scenario used in interviews involved a suspect vessel en route from 
the Middle East towards the West Coast of the U.S. Other scenarios might, in the future, engage 
other organizations and invoke other activities. The workflow represents the activities of the 
NAVCENT MOC (109 activities) and Naval Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) (50 
activities) in the greatest detail. The remaining organizations are represented by a dozen tasks or 
fewer.  
 
TOOLS TO SUPPORT MDA 
 
A suite of tools have been developed for the Spiral 1 phase and the prototypes will be assessed 
during the Trident Warrior 08 experiment where various venues exist to assess the level of 
improvement, as well as other venues. The Spiral 1 effort focuses on establishing a core net-
centric set of capabilities that, at multiple levels of security, will feed and fuse many data streams 
into a coherent common operational picture while providing improved analytical and 
collaboration tools. The following section describes the tools and the capabilities they provide 
for the Spiral 1 phase of MDA. 
 
Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA). Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA) 
was developed to support anomaly detection by collecting track information and identifying 
behavior that deviates from normal patterns of behavior, e.g., relationships between vessels and 
cargo. CMA supports sharing information across all CMA nodes from NMIC, Coast Guard, 
Combatant Commanders, Coalition partners, and tactical level commands and supports a number 
of tasks and functions that are part of the overall MDA process. CMA supports generation of 
tipper information (the initial step (first box) in the workflow diagram) via its object tracking 
capability: objects include people, cargo, financial transactions, vessels, vessel ownership and 
flag, etc. For example, connecting the name of a crew member, to related persons, to financial 
transactions, to a terrorist group can be accomplished in a much shorter time to provide tipper 
information on a vessel of interest (VOI), person of interest (POI), cargo of interest (COI), and 
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 so on. CMA extracts information from a wide range of sources and integrates this multi-source 
data. CMA is expected to improve the process by automatically correlating across many 
information sources to reduce the time required to perform critical tasks (e.g., reduce the time 
required to accomplish a task that currently takes many hours, down to minutes).   
 
CMA is expected to perform a more comprehensive correlation across multiple sources of 
information (~350 databases) due to automation of this process. For example, the correlation 
process is accomplished in near-real time as opposed to taking many hours. An explanation is 
provided to the user along with any tipper information, including all sources used by the system 
that have information that contributed. CMA will be installed and used at all levels depicted in 
the workflow diagram, i.e., from ONI, NAVCENT, CFIC, to tactical level forces, and will be 
used in slightly different ways depending on the organizational level depicted in the workflow 
diagram.  
 
It is anticipated that the ability to automate the search and correlation process across multiple 
sources represents a paradigm shift in that a significant reduction is expected in the amount of an 
analyst’s time that will be required for this part of the process. By automating this portion of the 
overall task it should free up the analysts to do the higher level analysis that is critical. An 
additional feature incorporated in CMA is persistent tracking of 200 vessels. This history of a 
track can be pulled into the analysis, e.g., ports visited along the route of the vessel.  CMA is 
based on the premise that greater transparency of existing data will translate into greater security.   
 
Track Assessment and Anomaly Detection – Maritime (TAANDEM).  TAANDEM is a track 
processing system to identify motion that is inconsistent with previous behavior patterns. This 
feature is based on processing archived data to determine key parameters of motion, and to 
design key detection statistics. The prediction and activity monitoring component provides real-
time track processing, the ability to identify deviant tracks, and facilitates the preparation of drill 
down evidence data for display. TAANDEM provides input to CMA in the form of annotated 
tracks.  
 
Alerts are generated by a specific factor that violates a boundary, which can involve anything 
that can be computed on a track. TAANDEM generates the degree of deviance from normalcy 
for any of these factors. The current plan is to let the user reconfigure settings (such as, 
parameters for boundaries, degree of deviance acceptable).  
 
MAGNET.  MAGNET uses agent logic to obtain data, using a web browser to query other data 
sources. MAGNET is installed at the Coast Guard, MIFCPAC. The web browser is used to query 
the system, regarding such topics as weather, ships in a specific area, and so on. 
 
Fast Connectivity for Coalition Agents Program (FastC2AP). FASTC2AP uses agent tech-
nologies to create “watch stander composeable automation,” where watch standers use agents to 
define and automate information management tasks. FastC2AP is based on a Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) developed predecessor tool, and uses PACFLT databases. 
The FASTC2AP tool set is web-enabled and uses data from incoming e-mails, Chat, Global 
Command and Control System–Maritime (GCCS-M), and various databases from around the 
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 world. Outputs include on-screen alerts, e-mails, and over-the-horizon (OTH) Gold messages 
that update GCCS-M tracks.   
 
FastC2AP is a collection of software tools, implemented through a web portal, which supports 
operators as they manage situational awareness and track behavior within their AOR. FastC2AP 
supports watch standers and analysts by automating many of the maritime track data manage-
ment tasks they typically perform now. The FastC2AP portal allows watch standers to (a) 
process vast amounts of a data, (b) access multiple databases, and (c) return relevant data for 
processing by analysis, fusion, and exploitation agents.  
 
E-MIO Wireless. Electronic Maritime Interdiction Operations (E-MIO) Wireless provides 
satellite transmission and reception for non-biometric boarding data (manifests, etc.) and 
automatically ingests data into authoritative databases.  
 
Google Applications and Chat. Google Applications and Chat provide a collaboration tool that 
includes alerts, chat, blogs, calendar, tabbed web portal, and productivity tools. Data are stored in 
a secure Navy enterprise maintained by Google; this tool supports sharing between the Navy, 
Department of State, Department of Justice, etc.  
 
Global Trader. Global Trader supports queries about cargo data and several types of automated 
analyses: anomaly detection (including both statistical and machine learning), pattern matching, 
and clustering, and provides alerts with supporting evidence.  
 
TRIPWIRE. TRIPWIRE mines unstructured text data and alerts analysts to messages of 
interest, based on user-defined, persistent alerting rules. This tool can perform more than 1.5 
million transactions in a growing database.  
 
Many questions remain regarding the effectiveness of the prototype MDA tools. These questions 
include where to set detection thresholds for anomaly detection, i.e., how many degrees of 
difference are appropriate? Other issues also pertain to the tradeoff between false alarms rate and 
missing a critical event. Reliance on databases raises the issue of the reliability of databases and 
their associated update rates.  
 
Technical Capabilities: Description of Technology Features 
From the MDA Scoping Document, the Spiral 1 effort focuses on establishing a core set of net-
centric capabilities that, at multiple levels of security, will feed and fuse many data streams into a 
coherent common operational picture while providing improved analytical and collaboration 
tools. Table 3 presents a brief summary of the MDA tools, features provided, and their associated 
benefits.  
Table 3.  Spiral 1 Tools, Features Provided and Benefits of Tools. 
 
MDA Tool Features Provided Benefits of Tool 
CMA Anomaly detection • Automates a previously manual process 
 Information sharing across organizational nodes • Facilitates collaboration 
 Object tracking • More tracks can be monitored 
 Integrates multi-source data, includes search  
agents, confidence reporting, and remote access  
• More comprehensive correlation  
     across multiple sources of information 
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  Automatic data correlation • Reduced time to perform tasks 
FASTC2AP Defines/ automates information management  
tasks 
• Generates alerts, emails, OTH Gold  
     messages that update GCCS-M tracks 
 Helps manage situational awareness  • Access to multiple databases 
 Processes large amounts of data by analysis, 
fusion, and exploitation agents 
• Helps manage situation awareness and  
     track behavior in an area of responsibility
TRIPWIRE Mines unstructured text data and alerts analysts • Increased relationships analyzed 
 User-defined persistent alerting rules • Reduced latency 
MAGNET Intelligent agent logic • Faster access to data 
 Web browser to query other data sources • More sources queried in less time 
 System queries regarding topics of interest in area • Increased number of analytic models 
  • Increased archived data for analysis 
TAANDEM Real-time track processing • Prediction and activity monitoring 
 Identify deviant tracks • Real-time track processing  
 Provides annotated tracks with alerts • Rule-based anomaly detection 
E-MIO Wireless Provides satellite transmission/ reception for  
unclassified boarding data 
• Automatically inserts data into  
     authoritative databases 
Google Applica- 
tions and Chat 
Collaboration tool: Alerts, chat, blogs, calendar,  
tabbed web portal, and productivity tools 
• Supports sharing between the Navy, Dept.
     of State, Dept. of Justice, etc. 
Global Trader Anomaly detection, pattern matching/ clustering, 
and provides alerts with supporting evidence 
• Supports queries regarding cargo and  
     data analyses 
 
 
MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS SPIRAL 1 ASSESSMENT PLAN 
 
The NPS assessment plan provides assessment guidance for the FY08 Spiral 1 events of the 
MDA Science and Technology (S&T) Prototype Acceleration effort.  
 
Spiral 1 Assessment Strategy 
The MDA 2008 Spiral 1 assessment efforts focus on identifying baseline performance para-
meters associated with the broadly stated capabilities for the present state of MDA technologies. 
Our approach was to develop an overarching assessment plan to refine objectives, develop 
measures and design data collection instruments so that analysis of the tools can be conducted 
and the results and recommendations can be forwarded to decision makers for continuing 
improvement in MDA. The NPS assessment effort includes developing performance metrics 
related to availability, reliability, timeliness, usability, and accuracy. Data on these attributes will 
be collected along with other specific parametric data that will be used to define the existing 
MDA performance capabilities. The assessment strategy was also developed to assist in 
establishing the operational baseline against which future improvements can be measured. This 
data will be collected at various MDA or MDA-related events, and other venues of opportunity 
listed in the schedule for Spiral 1.  
 
The NPS assessment plan combines input from many sources to develop an assessment plan built 
on previous studies that will enable decision makers to determine MDA effectiveness and 
shortcomings. We began by developing an understanding of the ‘present state’ of the Spiral-1 
technologies as documented in the MDA Scoping Document. This was followed by the scenario 
development that is presented in the scoping document. The scenarios were then used to 
formulate anticipated workflow models that were refined from both theoretic scenarios and 
multiple real-world site visits. The goal is to provide decision makers a concise, repeatable, and 
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 highly-refined methodology to improve MDA capabilities and to provide input that will support 
future budgetary allocations based on this analytical framework.   
 
The Spiral 1 assessment goals include the ability to: (a) understand the capabilities and 
limitations of the present state MDA prototype functional areas; (b) establish a baseline of 
operational parameters traceable to the MDA test and evaluation plan; (c) execute a Risk 
Reduction Limited Objective Demonstration prior to the initial operational capability (IOC); and 
(d) identify areas for improvement that may be employed in follow-on Spiral efforts.  
 
Use case development and use in planning.  The purpose for the use case analysis is to create a 
set of representative use cases (threads) that examine MDA as a system to include people, 
elements of doctrine, concept of operations (CONOPs), information exchange needs, methods 
for transporting information requirements, and tasks that will stimulate the tasks and various 
exchanges to reveal Spiral-1 performance capabilities and future needs requirements. An OV-5 
workflow model (IDEF view in UML) and an OV-6c event trace model are the primary 
mechanisms by which to create the use cases, with a data-flow model (OV-7) providing the 
information exchange requirements that meet the needs of watch standers and decision makers. 
 
The range of tasks at the user level, within MHQ/MOC is being defined in a data pull from 
NAVCENT, Commander, Pacific Forces (CPF), ONI, and other organizations at this time. 
Results of the data analysis provide an input to the development of the DoDAF views, and will 
be used by the Architecture Working Group which will in turn produce the models described 
above. A necessary component to be developed is the scenarios or vignettes that encompass 
those tasks and activities needed in IOC demonstrations. 
 
Metrics and Measures. MDA objectives have been organized into a three-level structure of 
objectives and metrics that facilitates the design of specific experimentation objectives. This 
approach has been used and refined over several years of fleet experimentation (e.g., TRIDENT 
WARRIOR) as it was developed for Navy Network-Centric Warfare Command 
(NAVNETWARCOM). The approach we are using entails detailed documentation of objectives, 
metrics, and all aspects of the measurement process.  
 
MDA Critical Tasks  
• Direct Operational Intelligence Activities  
• Process and Exploit Collected Operational Information  
• Produce Operational Intelligence and Prepare Intelligence Products  
• Disseminate and Integrate Operational Intelligence  
• Evaluate Intelligence Activities in the JOA  
• Collect and Share Operational Information  
• Acquire and Communicate Operational Level Information and Status  
• Assess the Operational Situation  
• Develop a Shared Understanding of the Situation  
• Prepare Plans and Orders  
• Command Subordinate Operational Forces  
• Coordinate and Integrate Joint/Multinational and Interagency Cooperation  
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 Metrics are needed to assess the effects of technology insertion relative to the current state of 
capabilities for MDA. Currently, there are few if any published standards that define the 
effectiveness of current solutions in operations. Moreover, a sufficiently detailed scenario is 
needed to drive testing and must systematically address the variety of MDA data types (vessel, 
people, cargo, etc.), reporting products, node interactions, and time course of activity in a 
problem that involves discovery, analysis, and prosecution of VOIs. Particularly important 
challenges in MDA include ISR management, collection planning, decisions regarding opposed 
and unopposed boardings, and tracking neutrals. In addition, scenario designers need to consider 
events in which multiple vessels collaborate in a threat incident, either through cargo transfer 
between vessels or by synchronized tactical actions of two or more vessels.  
 
Test Objectives Structure. MDA program objectives were obtained, however these do not 
include specific objectives for the various tests. Specific test objectives will be developed as part 
of the NPS assessment planning effort, derived from MDA program objectives. Test objectives 
are organized into the following six test areas: (1) supporting technology capabilities; (2) 
information processing capabilities; (3) operations performance status; (4) workflow status; (5) 
guidance quality; and (6) E-MIO operations capabilities. The objective categories for each test 
area are shown in Table 4.  
 
Table 4.  Test Areas and Objective Categories for MDA Program Objectives. 
 
Test Area   Test Area 
  Objective Category   Objective Category 
Supporting Technology Capabilities  Information Processes Capabilities 
  Monitoring & Collection  Monitoring & Collection 
  Processing/Fusion  Processing/Fusion 
  Analysis  Analysis 
  Dissemination  Dissemination 
  Archiving & Maintaining Repository  Archiving & Maintaining Repository 
       
Operations Performance Status  Workflow Status 
  Plan Operations  Structure 
  Execution  Organization 
  Execution Monitoring  Group 
  Execution Assessment  Individual 
      
Guidance Quality  E-MIO Operations Capabilities 
  TTP & SOP  Information Acquisition 
  CONOPS  Mission Planning 
  Command Guidance  Boarding Execution 
  Standing Orders  Execution Monitoring 
    Information Collection  
    Information Dissemination 
       Information Assessment 
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 The objective categories monitoring and collection, processing/fusion, etc., appear in two test 
areas. One set is for determining the capabilities of the various MDA information processes, the 
other is for determining the capabilities of the systems that support those processes. Specific 
objective types, their associated metrics, and objectives have been defined for each of the 
objective categories. The full set of objectives and metrics structure is currently being developed. 
E-MIO is a special test area, as E-MIO involves a specific operation, and the other areas are 
general and apply to the full range of MDA activities. Each test area includes several objective 
categories which correspond to the MDA objectives. 
 
Metrics Structure.  Metrics are based on: (1) attributes; (2) measures associated with each goal 
and attribute; and (3) any applicable standards/thresholds for the measures. The accepted MOP, 
MOE, MOU structure is used, with Measures of Readiness (MOR) added for acquisition 
purposes. MOR applies only to systems. Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) refers to the overall 
effectiveness of a system, people, or process to perform its stated mission. Measures of Perfor-
mance (MOP) are direct measures of a specific performance parameter of people, process, or 
system. Measures of Utility (MOU) include the effectiveness of organizations, humans, 
processes, or systems for supporting operational activities, or for guidance in directing those 
activities. Measure of Readiness (MOR) is used to determine if the system is ready for fielding.  
 
Table 5 contains the MOE, MOP, MOU attribute structure. For example, there are four attributes 
for measures of effectiveness (i.e., accessible, reliable, capable, and usable) and under each one 
are its component MOP attributes. There are also four attributes for MOU. MOP-level attributes 
for MOU are not shown; use of the MOP is appropriate, although most MOU determinations are 
made through surveys. Readiness is a combination of effectiveness, utility, whether there is a 
life-cycle plan, and whether trained personnel are in the pipeline for use of the system.  
 
Table 5. MOE, MOP, MOU Attribute Structure for MDA Assessment. 
 
Effective                     
  Accessible   Reliable   Capable   Usable MOE 
  Capacity  Robust  Sufficient  Clear MOP 
  Available  Persistent  Flexible  Trusted     " 
  Compatible  Secure  Accurate  Manageable     " 
  Extensive  Assured  Timely  Relevant     " 
  Efficient      Reach  Compliant     " 
         Automatic   Deployable     " 
Military Utility             
  Improved  Needed  Applicable  Wanted MOU 
Ready            
   Effective   Utility   Life-Cycle   Personnel MOR 
   System Readiness is a roll up of the component readiness measures (MOR) 
 
Task / Attribute / Measure Relationships.  Attributes and measures have meaning only when 
associated with an activity or task. Figure 5 depicts the various types of task, attribute, and 
measure associations encountered in military operations assessments. It is not sufficient to test 
system performance in isolation; it is also necessary to test the processes that systems serve, and 
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 the humans and organizations that execute the processes. The relationships shown in Figure 5 























































































We make approximately twenty recommendations based on these analyses. (For a more detailed 
reporting on this effort and the complete list of recommendations see, Freeman, Gallup, 
MacKinnon & Hutchins, 2008.) These recommendations concern training, provisioning, 
evaluation, management of technology enabled processes, and other issues. We recommend that 
the Navy build upon this work in the following ways: 
• Conduct technology assessments that focus on human factors issues: trainability, 
usability, utility, and the fit between technology, organizational structure, and processes.  
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 • Extend the current ‘as-is’ analysis to define MDA ‘to-be’ procedures that (1) conform to 
the MHQ w/ MOC and ONI process architectures and (2) are customized to the needs of 
specific users. 
• Develop instruments and techniques for monitoring, measuring, and managing workflow 
at critical junctures in the MDA process.  
• Implement a program to define a rapid, tailorable technology training program and 
measure its effectiveness. Adapt both the training and technology accordingly. 
 
Recommendations from Qualitative Analysis 
(1) Pay particular attention to planning and socializing the plan to train and maintain 
support for Spiral 1 technologies. This may allay concerns in COMPACFLT, 
NAVCENT, and elsewhere that the technology delivery is not paying sufficient 
attention to the human factor.  
(2) Training for Spiral 1 technology users and maintainers should be rapid, demonstrably 
effective, and customized to local missions and procedures. This will address 
concerns that technology won’t support local missions and processes for staffs with 
high turnover. 
(3) Given the potential that staff will use new MDA technologies infrequently in some 
organizations, they may forget how to use the technologies accurately and efficiently. 
Usability, training, and technical support will be particularly important predictors of 
success in these organizations. These should be a focus of assessment. 
(4) Technology providers should continue to brief user communities concerning the 
maturity and delivery schedules for technologies. This may help users to prepare for 
the specific capability they will receive.  
(5) The accreditation process must be carefully managed across the Spiral 1 technologies. 
Lessons learned should be used to accelerate that process. 
 
Assessing the Effect of Spiral 1 Technologies 
PEW participants offered ideas for assessing the effects of Spiral 1 technologies on tasks, though 
there were few specific measures suggested and no performance standards. These strategies for 
assessing the fit of technologies to tasks fell into three categories, which should be a focus of 
future experiments and evaluations: affects on (1) access to information (that was previously 
inaccessible by the performing entity); (2) speed of decision making; and (3) accuracy of 
decision making.  
 
Future Work 
NPS will proceed with its planned assessment activities and the majority of the assessment 
events will occur in Spring/Summer 2008. This includes collecting and refining objectives, as 
well as defining each objective’s goals, guiding questions, system requirements, measures to be 
recorded, and data collection plan. The assessment plan for each objective will be placed into a 
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